In January 1994, the presidents of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine signed an agreement to withdraw all Soviet nuclear weapons from Ukraine. The country traded missiles for security guarantees that turned out to be ineffective.
It was a historic day 30 years ago: On January 14, 1994, Ukraine, Russia, and the United States signed a trilateral declaration in Moscow to surrender all former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons to Russia. Ukraine had already surrendered its tactical nuclear weapons to Moscow in May 1992. Negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons then began. Washington was particularly interested in them because of their range and ability to attack the United States.
The January 1994 agreement paved the way for Ukraine's ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in November, and finally, on December 5 of that year, the infamous Budapest Memorandum, in which Kiev pledged to surrender its nuclear weapons. US financial support for the removal of security guarantees and related infrastructure from the United States, Great Britain and Russia.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine formally possessed the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal, behind the United States and Russia. For example, Kiev has 176 ICBMs capable of carrying 1,272 nuclear warheads. 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons were initially deployed in Ukraine. The last warship left the country on June 2, 1996. What is particularly bitter from today's perspective is that by 2006, Ukraine had also handed over some strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons to Russia – in return for gas supplies.
Today, giving up nuclear weapons is seen as a mistake
Russia is now using these bombers in its war against Ukraine. They carried inaccurate Ch-22 cruise missiles, which hit a shopping center in Kremenchuk in 2022 and a residential building in Dnipro in 2023. There were several dozen deaths in both cases. Other Tu22M3 bombers were destroyed or sent to museums.
Whether it is right to give up nuclear weapons from the Ukrainian perspective has been debated in Kiev since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Indeed, through the Budapest Memorandum, Russia also respects Ukraine's territorial integrity and is committed to protecting it even in the event of external aggression, without launching a war against it. However, the document contained no direct commitments to Ukraine's military defense or suggested mechanisms for economic sanctions against the aggressors. After 2014, even convening consultations among participants is practically impossible. Specifically, the UN will only act if nuclear weapons are used against Ukraine. Appeal to the Security Council.
Therefore, there is a widespread view that freeing up nuclear weapons in Ukraine and beyond is a mistake. Another question is whether Ukraine could have acted differently. This is not feasible for political, technical and economic reasons. After all, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons was America's top priority—the Clinton administration at the time saw Russia as a more stable country than the young, chaotic Ukrainian democracy. “Clinton talked at the time about sanctions if Ukraine behaved differently. Could Ukraine, the first born, immediately become a threat to the world and Europe?” Leonid Kravchuk, the first president of Ukraine at the time told the situation.
The launch systems were in Russia
Technically, Ukraine was essentially a site for a nuclear arsenal and did not control it. Theoretically, Russia could have launched ICBMs from the territory of Ukraine at that time, as all missile systems were located in the Russian Federation. “All I could do was call the commander of the Russian missile army,” recalled Kravchuk, who died in May 2022 and signed the tripartite declaration in January 1994. “Nuclear Weapons Beyond Ukraine's Control.” Nevertheless, Leonid Kuchma, Kravchuk's successor as first prime minister and then president, signed the Budapest Memorandum and later spoke in favor of acquiring 46 intercontinental ballistic missiles, representing the most powerful part of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal.
Indeed, obtaining nuclear weapons for Ukraine would have been a very costly undertaking. For example, China, which has a nuclear capacity seven times smaller than Ukraine's since the fall of the Soviet Union, spends $12 billion a year on its maintenance. Ukraine, which suffered a massive economic crisis in the 1990s, had no money. Additionally, the shelf life of most Soviet nuclear weapons would have expired by 1997. The costs of replacing them can be enormous.
Whether Ukraine could have negotiated a better deal is another matter, and in some circumstances it might have been possible. However, no better document could have changed the course of history than the Budapest Memorandum. In the current offensive, Russia continues to officially target a neutral Ukraine. But Ukraine remained neutral and had neutrality in its constitution in 2014 when Moscow annexed Crimea and invaded the Donbass. A direct and logical consequence of the 2014 invasion was that Ukraine subsequently incorporated the strategic goal of integration with the European Union and NATO into its constitution.
Moscow's promises are futile
By annexing Crimea, Russia has not only violated the Budapest Memorandum. In 2003, under Putin's presidency, Moscow finally recognized Ukraine's borders, including Crimea. As for the current war, all these distractions are, above all, Moscow's promises worthless. Ukraine's acceptance of neutrality in exchange for security guarantees is unthinkable. From today's perspective, the only possible guarantee for Kiev is NATO membership, perhaps the effect of Article 5 only for the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government, or comparable guarantees from the United States.
Neither will be developed in consultation with Moscow, but rather independently. But if this does not happen after a possible ceasefire, even greater militarization of Ukraine than before is inevitable. The prospect of Ukrainian nuclear weapons, which today seems completely absurd, may be on the agenda at some point, especially given the country's strong mineral base of uranium ores.
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