Battles for Soledar and Bachmut: “more political than strategic”

Are the cities of Soledar and Bachmut really strategically important? Probably not, says Cady, a military expert. Above all, the Kremlin cares more about political success. Is the Ukrainian leadership miscalculating?

tagesschau.de: What is the significance of the Battles of Solidar and Bagmuth in the overall context of the war?

Franz-Stephen Gaddy: I will not overstate the importance of these fights. If Soledar and Bakhmut fall, the overall strategic situation on the front will not change significantly. It’s still a battlefield. Russia, from a purely military point of view, is not about taking territory as much as bleeding and tying down Ukrainian forces and thereby preventing a ground attack – say from Zaporizhia by targeting Melitopol.

In the coming weeks and months, about 200,000 additional troops mobilized by the Russian armed forces will be deployed — an estimated 100,000 currently in Ukraine. Then an attack could take place in the Kharkiv region or from Belarus.

However, I think the chances of success if Kiev is attacked from the direction of Belarus are relatively low. But this is an additional problem that Ukrainian civil servants have to contend with.

“Kremlin needs a win”

tagesschau.de: How great is the strategic value of Soledar and Bachmut?

Reptiles: The value of these cities is not so strategic, although it should be noted that Pakmut is an important transportation hub in the region. It is more about declaring that this city is important because both sides are important.

I believe that Pakmut is of political importance, mainly to the Kremlin. He needs victory for the Russian divisions. Internal factors are at play here, given that Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov and Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner mercenaries, have repeatedly emphasized in recent months that their units were able to gain territory.

A victory at Soledar and Bakhmut would be a victory for the Russian forces. Victory will be defined primarily by inflicting heavy casualties on Ukrainian forces. Of course, they are very large on the Russian side and among Wagner’s mercenaries, and out of 50,000 mustered there, probably 10,000 to 15,000 mercenaries have already been killed or wounded.

“Miscalculation by the Ukrainian leadership”

tagesschau.de: Does it make any strategic sense to confront the Ukrainians at this point rather than conserving their forces for other fights?

Reptiles: Here I can only speculate as to what determines the actions of the Ukrainian political leadership. There may have been a miscalculation here.

Last summer, in the battles for Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, it issued the motto of no retreat. This led to heavy losses on the Ukrainian side, but even more so on the Russian armed forces. At that time the Russian side had a shortage of infantry, i.e. foot soldiers and reserves in general. Now the Russian side does not have that deficit because they have reserves in the region, although they are poorly armed and trained to engage in a fight.

Bachmood is of minor military importance. Perhaps the Russian idea was to draw the Ukrainians into a war by giving political importance to the city so that the Ukrainians would not launch a winter offensive or postpone their announced spring offensive.

If there is no real major offensive from the Ukrainian side, this means that this atrocious effect has developed and that the Ukrainian armed forces do not currently have the capability to carry out offensive operations. We know from multiple reports from various intelligence agencies that both sides are running low on ammunition.

“It is implausible that Russian forces can capture Kiev”

tagesschau.de: There is now frequent speculation that there may be a new Russian attack on the capital Kyiv – which you already mentioned at the beginning. Are there any signs of this? And what are the chances of success?

Reptiles: It is possible. The only question is: what kind of Ukrainian forces will it bind? And would the Russian armed forces’ chances of victory be any better than they were in February 2022 when it wasn’t working with significantly more Russian troops and what they saw as a better balance of power?

At least 200,000 to 300,000 soldiers would be needed to capture Kai in urban warfare. At this stage it is completely implausible for the Russian forces to capture Gaya because the forces are not there.

“Both sides learned”

tagesschau.de: The Ukrainian Armed Forces have learned since February.

Reptiles: Yes, they are well prepared for the attack and know from which direction it may come. Arrangements on the Belarusian and Russian sides will not go unnoticed.

I don’t think the Russian armed forces have a big chance of success because the stuff is going to be very difficult. There is still no air superiority, there are few traversable roads and a limited rail network.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces now have more defensive experience, are numerically stronger and have well-established, defensive positions. The tactical element of surprise will also be absent for the Russian armed forces, as Ukrainian and Western adversary intelligence is well-functioning.

However, the Russians also learned something new, which is often suppressed. Both sides try to adapt and use new operational concepts on how to defeat the enemy on the battlefield.

“It’s ultimately about breaking the will to fight”

tagesschau.de: Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that the Russian armed forces will be satisfied with the status quo, especially since the effect of mobilization has not yet been fully utilized.

Reptiles: The main goal of the Russian armed forces, on a purely military basis, is not the most rapid territorial gains. This would tie down Ukrainian forces in other parts of the country, inflict significant losses on them, and ultimately break their will to fight. Or prolong the conflict until Western support steps in.

Eckhardt Arates the Conversation, tagesschau.de